So for my international politics class I have to debate an issue i know little about. the topic is

"Is Patient Diplomacy the Best Approach to Iran’s Nuclear Program?"

I have the Pro side of the issue. Anyone have any opinions on this issue or could offer up some insight on the issue?

[Edited on March 14, 2009 at 6:04 PM. Reason : /]

3/14/2009 6:04:09 PM

3/14/2009 6:05:31 PM

we should totally bomb the fuck out of them!!1

3/14/2009 6:05:51 PM

our intel has failed us before recently, for one

3/14/2009 6:06:08 PM

^ that still blows my mind. knowing what i know about our intel capabilities, i cannot even comprehend how we missed on that one. of course, there's the issue of the administration at the time cherry-picking intel to paint the picture they wanted, but still...even though intel is often an inexact science, I can't believe they didn't have a better handle on that issue. I mean, we know some CRAZY shit relating to threat countries. We know stuff about them and their stuff that THEY don't even know, in some cases.

3/14/2009 7:47:51 PM

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"I have the Pro side of the issue. Anyone have any opinions on this issue or could offer up some insight on the issue? "

oh, i dont know... that whole preventative/preemptive war thing worked so well for us in Iraq.

3/14/2009 9:56:34 PM

Patient diplomacy = we're going to let them do whatever the fuck they want as long as it doesn't hurt us...yet...

3/14/2009 11:07:59 PM

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"I have the Pro side of the issue. Anyone have any opinions on this issue or could offer up some insight on the issue?"

Right now, Iran has a stated ability to enrich Uranium. Our main dispute with this is that they shouldn't need this capability due to the fact that they can purchase low-enriched Uranium for reactors off the world market.

Our problem with enrichment is that it can be misused to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a bomb.

Basically, Uranium comes in two main "flavors" in nature - 238, which is about 99.3% abundant in nature, and U235, which is 0.72%. Now, in order to run a light-water reactor, we use a complex process of enrichment to "sort" 235 - up to about 3.5%.

If someone were to run that same Uranium back through the process over and over again, eventually the 235 would be of high enough purity for a bomb.

However, this would require substantial time and effort, and with proper monitoring and safeguards, could easily be detected.

Furthermore, we have no evidence that Iran has made any attempt to do so. Thus, our main case is that they have a sensitive technology with the capability of misuse, and a stated past intent for misuse, but no current evidence of any further work toward misuse. (i.e., intelligence estimates that they stopped active nuclear weapons pursuit several years ago.)

Thus, our main goal, should we engage them, would be for monitoring and inspection of their nuclear facilities.

What we want is a complete dismantlement of their enrichment capacity. Which just ain't going to happen.

3/15/2009 1:15:39 AM

Are you taking that class with Figgins?

3/15/2009 11:20:17 AM

I thought Figgins only did international law?

At any rate, DrSteve presents your case for you quite well. I'd add that Iranians have a strong sense of national pride, and more proactive efforts to limit what they see as their right as an important nation may cause a lot more anger than is already there.

3/15/2009 2:02:51 PM

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"I'd add that Iranians have a strong sense of national pride, and more proactive efforts to limit what they see as their right as an important nation may cause a lot more anger than is already there."

Bingo. A nuclear weapons program - or even a homemade civilian nuclear power program - is a big prestige/status item. i.e., "We're just as advanced as any first-world power."

[Edited on March 15, 2009 at 2:17 PM. Reason : .]

3/15/2009 2:17:10 PM

And the pursuit of that prestige is a big part of what keeps the Iranian government in power. If they are perceived by their people to have failed in that goal, it threatens their power.

Something that might help your pro-diplomacy argument -- and something I'd like to see discussed, come to think -- is something else we could offer to satisfy the national pride Iran. What could we give them that increases their status but doesn't pose a threat to us? Is there anything? Nothing leaps to my mind offhand. Perhaps it's possible to bribe them enough to make them forget about their wounded ego.

If we could find something appropriate to offer, it might not work, but at least it would let us know the Iranians real intentions. They don't have a practical need for a nuclear program -- their power requirements could be met just as easily through other means. Which leaves prestige and the bomb. If satisfying their prestige doesn't do the job, then that leaves nukes.

3/15/2009 2:52:02 PM

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"If we could find something appropriate to offer, it might not work, but at least it would let us know the Iranians real intentions. They don't have a practical need for a nuclear program -- their power requirements could be met just as easily through other means."

Or even simply if we could prevail upon them to either abandon enrichment or adopt international safeguards / open inspections. Let them keep their civilian nuclear power program, so long as they submit to mass balance audits and the like. If they refuse, claiming "state secrets" or whatnot, as you said, the ruse is up.

One project of Bush Administration's GNEP program and the IAEA was the idea of a "fuel bank" - i.e., the IAEA would broker out Uranium fuel such to avoid supply interruptions (including over say, political differences). The idea was to make the enrichment and manufacture of fuel by non-weapons states essentially unnecessary. One can apply a similar logic to this case.

[Edited on March 15, 2009 at 3:48 PM. Reason : clarifying]

3/15/2009 3:48:18 PM

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"If they refuse, claiming "state secrets" or whatnot, as you said, the ruse is up."

The problem is that their refusal might not necessarily imply a ruse. Submitting to international inspections is submitting to secondary status. To my knowledge nobody is forcing the US, France, or China to undergo regular inspections. Accepting something that we are not ourselves forced to accept means admitting that you're not quite as good, and that doesn't work.

It may also be important to Iranians that their government could make a bomb even if they don't actually intend to do so. For prestige purposes, the possibility of nukes might work just as well as having an arsenal.

As far as I'm concerned, issues of Iranian prestige take a back seat to the prevailing security issues for the US and its allies, but the logic that refusal to accept inspections = tacit admissions of ulterior motives is flimsy, and has failed us badly in the past. It was very important to Saddam that his people think he could stand up to the West, and arguably just as important that they think he actually had terrible weapons (if only because they were afraid of those weapons being used on them).

3/15/2009 5:00:52 PM

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"The problem is that their refusal might not necessarily imply a ruse. Submitting to international inspections is submitting to secondary status. To my knowledge nobody is forcing the US, France, or China to undergo regular inspections. Accepting something that we are not ourselves forced to accept means admitting that you're not quite as good, and that doesn't work."

Actually, I'm pretty sure France does. The US is also a signatory to the IAEA Additional Protocol, as well as China. So, these standards really do apply to us under the NPT.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Additional_Protocol

Quote :

"As far as I'm concerned, issues of Iranian prestige take a back seat to the prevailing security issues for the US and its allies, but the logic that refusal to accept inspections = tacit admissions of ulterior motives is flimsy, and has failed us badly in the past. It was very important to Saddam that his people think he could stand up to the West, and arguably just as important that they think he actually had terrible weapons (if only because they were afraid of those weapons being used on them)."

I should clarify - it's certainly not causus belli or anything, but it's fairly suspect. Every non-weapons state under the NPT has to abide by certain protocols - claiming exception is a fairly extreme reaction, especially given the already aggravating condition of insisting upon implementing sensitive dual-use technologies in a country which is a strong proliferation risk. In as much, any refusal to go along with an inspection regime should be met with strong diplomatic consequences - and vice versa.

[Edited on March 15, 2009 at 6:03 PM. Reason : .]

3/15/2009 5:59:45 PM

Fair enough (although I notice we only put our part into effect a couple of months ago). It still becomes a tricky issue of them agreeing in a way that seems voluntary. We weren't bullied into signing on. We developed our nuclear weapons program quite substantially before the NPT ever existed. Iran can also point out that we don't give Israel any shit for developing its own nuclear arsenal without so much as declaring, let alone signing the NPT and Additional Protocol.

Another important question is whether we actually do submit to short-notice inspects. Sure, we signed a thing agreeing to let the IAEA do its thing, but has anyone ever tried? I'm asking; I honestly don't know. Even if we're theoretically subject to the same restrictions, it's a hard sell in Iran if they're getting investigated constantly while many other countries get left alone.

3/15/2009 6:07:34 PM

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"It still becomes a tricky issue of them agreeing in a way that seems voluntary. We weren't bullied into signing on. We developed our nuclear weapons program quite substantially before the NPT ever existed. Iran can also point out that we don't give Israel any shit for developing its own nuclear arsenal without so much as declaring, let alone signing the NPT and Additional Protocol."

The bigger issue here is simply the overall disparity under the NPT between weapons and non-weapons states. Iran seems to chafe against the notion that the West (and Israel) can develop a nuclear arsenal with impunity. But this is a greater problem with the NPT framework as a whole - non-weapons states are expected to never develop weapons. Thus, weapons states are in effect "locked in."

Basically - Iran's compliance can't just come with a stick - there has to be some kind of carrot to their compliance as well. Something like more normalized relations in return for substantial cooperation and compliance.

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"Even if we're theoretically subject to the same restrictions, it's a hard sell in Iran if they're getting investigated constantly while many other countries get left alone."

It is a tough sell, but then again, most other countries don't insist upon a domestic enrichment industry. Therein lies the rub. We don't want them having it at all. If we are to maintain a check upon their nuclear ambitions through diplomatic channels, stringent safeguards and monitoring are about the only way you can do it.

3/15/2009 6:16:13 PM

I realize you just gave it as an example, but I'm not sure how much normalized relations would help. Iran doesn't like or trust the US, and we gave them ample reason to feel that way. And with normalized relations comes an embassy, and the US embassy in Tehran is still reviled as the center of CIA activity that fucked up their country so bad. It also doesn't help the prestige factor that they are trading their right to science and defense for the honor of American recognition.

As you say, there are problems with the NPT that go far beyond just the Iranian problem. But overall I suspect that any submission to its requirements will be seen by relevant players as the government backing down.

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"It is a tough sell, but then again, most other countries don't insist upon a domestic enrichment industry."

This is not likely to matter to the Iranian people. If you think of your country as especially important, and all the more so when you base this thought on a history of lost or diminished importance, your motivations become special. Sure, other countries don't insist on this sort of program, but other countries aren't Iran, are they? They're lesser states, New World inventions or Western puppets. We have ambitions befitting a people as great as the Persians.

3/15/2009 6:44:33 PM

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"I thought Figgins only did international law?"

I took a couple of classes with him back in the day. No idea what he teaches now.

3/15/2009 10:01:57 PM