Quote :

"I hope that was clear enough."

Crystal clear, but ultimately not indicative of mutual exclusivity. Psychology could concern itself with the study of philosophical paradigmatic preferences and the forces that drive them. The conundrum becomes clearer then. Philosophical knowledge cannot be derived through any mechanisms but those entangled with the central nervous system. Its function is empirically studied through psychology.

Greater psychological understanding breeds new paradigms within philosophy.

I'm attempting to establish an interrelationship.

Quote :

"Case in point: provide me your reasoning for believing that all things that last exactly an hour last exactly sixty minutes. Why do you believe it? I'd argue you believe it simply because you understand what is being said."

Those are the fundamentals to which I'm referring. Why believe it's 60 minutes? Why believe, in daily experience, in the eternal nature of the lines on the map of the Globe at all? Or that the words on the news represent truth of any capacity? Or in the capacity of socially-agreed upon fictions like dollar bills, and governments, and taxes, and all that rot to actually perform their stated benefits to high standards?

(to the rest later, I'm tired now )

9/20/2006 9:51:32 PM

Quote :

"Philosophical knowledge cannot be derived through any mechanisms but those entangled with the central nervous system. Its function is empirically studied through psychology. "

Assuming the central nervous system actually exists and works like we observe it to exist and work. See the problem? You can't circumvent basic problems with empirical observation by citing a system built upon empirical observation.

I'm not suggesting mutual exclusivity in a high sense, just that psychology cannot solve epistemological issues, because epistemology lies at the heart of what we consider to be the knowledge contained in psychology.

Quote :

"Those are the fundamentals to which I'm referring. Why believe it's 60 minutes? Why believe, in daily experience, in the eternal nature of the lines on the map of the Globe at all? Or that the words on the news represent truth of any capacity? Or in the capacity of socially-agreed upon fictions like dollar bills, and governments, and taxes, and all that rot to actually perform their stated benefits to high standards?"

You're mistaking logically contigent propositions for analytically true propositions. What I said was true by definition. "The words on the news represent truth in any capacity" is a logically contingent proposition -- it could be true or not true.

EDIT:

Also, the title of this thread strikes me as being a bit off-color. I think I'd agree more with something like epistemologically-warranted or epistemologically-sound.

[Edited on September 20, 2006 at 10:15 PM. Reason : .]

9/20/2006 10:09:51 PM

Please note well that there should be no hyphen between an "ly" adverb preceding an "ed" adjective ("On Epistemologically-Constructed [sic] Belief Systems"). An adverb does not modify a noun. One would not write, "Epistemologically Belief Systems." Thus, the adjective is needed and the element in question should not be hyphenated.

Before you tackle advanced concepts, Gamecat, perhaps you should philosophize about the fundamentals. It is just a thought.

9/21/2006 3:46:11 AM

There's nothing wrong with starting an inquiry into philosophy with epistemology, it's not a bad point of departure.

9/21/2006 8:47:18 AM

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: We can always poll our internal mental state, and we're always right about it beyond a shadow of a doubt."

This is where it gets tricky, and I begin to have my own philosophical doubts on grounds that can be better understood in terms of the interplays between psychology (you're correct) and linguistics. Statements of "always" and absolutism do not reflect sound reasoning in light of the unquestionably extant face of the philosophical unknown. We're simply not always right about it beyond a shadow of a doubt. In fact we don't know we're always right about it. For all we know we're only partially right about it.

"Right" itself is a derivative of experience. It reflects philosophical preference.

Philosophy emerges from an individual's grasp of his own individual and cultural psychology because he'd have to stake out epistemological preferences order to have anything to poll in the first place. Such is the predominating substance of one's psyche.

Because philosophy cannot ultimately emerge from any other source than the combination of one's psyche and his linguistic model, I argue the three are inextricably codependent on one another. Since belief systems are ultimately explainable in terms of psychology, I choose to employ their methods to describe them that way, not by ascribe absolutist objective truth to the descriptions.

Epistemologically derived knowledge informs one's beliefs, even about epistemology. Psychological preferences influence where epistemological understanding is punctuated, and which belief systems are accepted or rejected by an individual. Linguistic models affect and covary along with each.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: 1) a special kind of "perceptive inference" that allows one to believe that what they see is, most likely, what currently exists there"

This perceptive inference is where the language of psychology can, or at minimum must be allowed to enter the debate. Perception and belief are intimately involved in the formation of ideas, thoughts, words, and actions. What perceptive inferences are allowable? For what reasons? Are they all epistemologically a priori?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: 2) a belief that when I see X, that it is a good reason to believe that seeing X is symptomatic of X existing before me. This belief is formed through past experience, but does not regress to that past experience. The current belief that allows one to think that what they see is what is there is formed by previous experience, but does not regress to it as a direct "reason". Even so, there's still a stopping point when you regress backwards. It's like saying "When X obtains, I perceive that X obtains" or something to that agree. Why does X obtain? It's a statement about the world -- it just is. I might have muddled that up a bit."

That's what I'd argue inform our epistemological preferences. Linguistic hypnotization or reinforcement. From distinguishing between the truth of distinction between the table and the silverware on it, or the atomically-thin line between our bodies and the external environment around it.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Either way, the answer to your question is yes -- we do know at least some things."

Like what?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Either way, the answer to your question is yes -- we do know at least some things. Even if you take an extremely skeptical view and claim that all sensory input is fully deceptive all of the time, then I'd tell you that we can still know analytic a priori judgments in and of themselves."

Very limited and narrowly defined ones, perhaps. Each, I'd argue still reflects a philosophical preference on at least a basic level.

The social constructions behind the 60 minutes equalling an hour doesn't make either objectively true, or even concrete constructions. Just agreed upon. That agreement is an admission of the uncertainty.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: No no, I'm not suggesting some Kantian "moral necessity" or anything similar to make us accept the existence of the noumenal world. I'm talking about things that are quite phenomenal. Non-inferential knowledge is knowledge that you know simply because you know it -- but this isn't to suggest that "anything goes". We're talking about very basic things here, like very basic perceptive inferences and analytic a priori judgments."

Excellent distinction. I'll be curious to see what a priori judgments are preferred to others.

---

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Assuming the central nervous system actually exists and works like we observe it to exist and work. See the problem? You can't circumvent basic problems with empirical observation by citing a system built upon empirical observation."

I agree. I just think I needed somebody else to make the point for it to be credible.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: I'm not suggesting mutual exclusivity in a high sense, just that psychology cannot solve epistemological issues, because epistemology lies at the heart of what we consider to be the knowledge contained in psychology."

Not alone. But an understanding of philosophy and psychology inform one another. Shaped through linguistics and cognition.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: You're mistaking logically contigent propositions for analytically true propositions. What I said was true by definition. "The words on the news represent truth in any capacity" is a logically contingent proposition -- it could be true or not true."

I think the error is the idea of "the mistake." Freeing yourself from the conception of things as true OR not true, as opposed to true in one sense, true in another sense, and another, etc. There are degrees of truth not necessarily true and false.

I agree.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Also, the title of this thread strikes me as being a bit off-color. I think I'd agree more with something like epistemologically-warranted or epistemologically-sound."

I'll agree to the latter.

9/21/2006 1:15:12 PM

Okay first of all I got 3 hours of sleep last night and I'm exausted -- so take it easy on me if I make a huge error.

------

Quote :

"We're simply not always right about it beyond a shadow of a doubt. In fact we don't know we're always right about it. For all we know we're only partially right about it."

I firmly disagree. Our knowledge of our own mental state is necessarily true (statements such as "I am currently feeling sad", "I have the belief that X").

Your doubts about self-presenting mental states was solved in Descartes Meditations with the argument "cogito ergo sum". You can assert that you may be fooled about your own internal mental states when you refute "I think, therefore I am". This knowledge is necessarily true.

Your mental states might not correctly represent external knowledge, but knowledge of what these states are is self-presenting. Descartes was off-base on a lot, but one thing that he was absolutely right about was his defeat of ultimate skepticism with the cogito argument.

Quote :

""Right" itself is a derivative of experience. It reflects philosophical preference."

You're right in terms of perceptual experience. Knowledge of your own mental state isn't subject to this degree of fallibility. "I have the belief that X..." is a statement that, given you actually DO have the belief that X, is necessarily true. I understand your attempt to label all experience as somehow disconnected from the truth -- but this isn't the case for the internal world of the observer.

Quote :

"Because philosophy cannot ultimately emerge from any other source than the combination of one's psyche and his linguistic model, I argue the three are inextricably codependent on one another. Since belief systems are ultimately explainable in terms of psychology, I choose to employ their methods to describe them that way, not by ascribe absolutist objective truth to the descriptions."

This is all fine -- we can philosophize because we have brains. However, you seem to be misunderstanding my position on the separation between philosophy and psychology. Without solving basic philosophical issues, we cannot accept the conclusions of psychology philosophically. At the level of epistemology, upon which all knowledge of psychology is dependent, psychological discussion is irrelevant and inappropriate.

You say that these are "I argue the three are inextricably codependent on one another". Yes, perhaps in the reality of things, but not philosophically. Philosophically we have to deal with things as the observer. If there are legitimate issues with those observations, then we cannot use those observations in any proof.

You bring up decent points about psychology past this point (at least ones that show a good application of psychology to philosophy), but I'm going to refrain to respond to them for reasons I've already discussed.

Quote :

"The social constructions behind the 60 minutes equalling an hour doesn't make either objectively true, or even concrete constructions. Just agreed upon. That agreement is an admission of the uncertainty."

Philosophically, it is certain. It's true. There is no interpretation of any analytically true statement that renders it false, no possible configuration of the world. This is called true as per "form" or "type". P or not P. Necessarily true.

The linguistic avenue should be discussed from a philosophy of language perspective to be relevant, not a psychological one.

Let me abbreviate what I'm trying to say -- using psychology to solve epistemological problems begs the question.

Oh, also:

Quote :

"There are degrees of truth not necessarily true and false."

Not in logic. Give me an interpretation of P that does not satisfy (P or not P).

9/21/2006 1:41:33 PM

Quote :

"I firmly disagree. Our knowledge of our own mental state is necessarily true (statements such as "I am currently feeling sad", "I have the belief that X")."

I firmly disagree with the premise. How is our knowledge of our own mental state necessarily true if they simply describe our impressions?

Descartes can take a hike. Sartre refuted it by turning it on its head. "I am therefore I think."

What philosophical distinction doesn't represent a preference of one over the other?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Your mental states might not correctly represent external knowledge, but knowledge of what these states are is self-presenting."

Where is the distinction between internal and external knowledge, and why is it made?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Descartes was off-base on a lot, but one thing that he was absolutely right about was his defeat of ultimate skepticism with the cogito argument."

Linguistics have defined your premise as rejectable on perspectivist if not relativistic grounds. For instance...

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: "I have the belief that X..." is a statement that, given you actually DO have the belief that X, is necessarily true."

What if you profess no absolute belief? Truth again, is not a simple word. Even for Descartes. Truth has degrees, and is intrinsically linked to perspective.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: I understand your attempt to label all experience as somehow disconnected from the truth -- but this isn't the case for the internal world of the observer."

What separates the internal world of the observer from the external world of the observed?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: At the level of epistemology, upon which all knowledge of psychology is dependent, psychological discussion is irrelevant and inappropriate."

That's what the word codependent was used to avoid. Information does not transmit one way. You're demonstrating a preference to believe it does. Epistemology informs psychology--true--and in like fashion, knowledge derived from psychology also informs epistemology.

I understand perfectly well that Psychology, like Religion, like all Science, is a derived from Epistemology. I'm questioning the view that the informational exchange relationships between them are all one-way.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Philosophically we have to deal with things as the observer. If there are legitimate issues with those observations, then we cannot use those observations in any proof."

The prevailing philosophy is what I was getting at. I agree fully we must deal with the observer philosophically in order to construct an epistemologically sound belief system. Few, I'd argue, do. I introduced the language through which my questions stem pretty well here: "From distinguishing between the truth of distinction between the table and the silverware on it, or the atomically-thin line between our bodies and the external environment around it."

Where the line between each exists, or if it exists, is a worthy epistemological question you shouldn't refrain from answering.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Philosophically, it is certain. It's true. There is no interpretation of any analytically true statement that renders it false, no possible configuration of the world. This is called true as per "form" or "type". P or not P. Necessarily true."

I fully disagree. As with the social constructions of borders, there are perfectly analytically true statements that render it false. Inconsistency being one. They represent distinctions agreed upon by multiple observers, but are not necessarily "true" things. They have a limitation on the degree of truth assignable to them: "socially constructed truth."

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Let me abbreviate what I'm trying to say -- using psychology to solve epistemological problems begs the question."

And those questions are the territory of philosophy. But I fundamentally recognize what you're saying here and have for a bit.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Not in logic. Give me an interpretation of P that does not satisfy (P or not P)."

I'm thinking particle physics could do this better than I can. Here are some attempts:

P: Electrons = waves
P: Electrons = particles
P: Waves cannot be particulate
P: Particles cannot be waves

In truth, I'm hoping this example is invalid and that you can break down for me why.

9/21/2006 2:07:55 PM

Quote :

"I firmly disagree with the premise. How is our knowledge of our own mental state necessarily true if they simply describe our impressions?"

I'm glad you said this. They are right BECAUSE they simply describe our impressions. Our impressions ARE our own mental state.

Quote :

"Descartes can take a hike. Sartre refuted it by turning it on its head. "I am therefore I think.""

Hobbes also made fun of it by saying "Argito ergo sum", or "I walk therefore I am". Descartes was wrong because he tried to interpret I think therefore I am BOTH directions. If you think, you must necessarily exist. You cannot be deceived about your own existence because if you're being deceived, there must be something to be deceived -- you exist.

Descartes WAS off base when he said "Therefore, I am in essence a thinking thing." whoops! Doesn't mean the first way is incorrect though.

Quote :

"Where is the distinction between internal and external knowledge, and why is it made?"

Internal mental state: I am currently having the visual experience of seeing a table in front of me.
Knowledge that might be wrong: I see a table in front of me.

Quote :

"What if you profess no absolute belief? Truth again, is not a simple word. Even for Descartes. Truth has degrees, and is intrinsically linked to perspective."

Truth has no degrees. Justification and warrant for believing things has degrees. Things are or are not the case. Our picture of these things can be and are fuzzy and not quite congruent. This is due to observing phenomena, but being off limits to noumena.

Quote :

"What separates the internal world of the observer from the external world of the observed?"

Perception. (the act of sensing things)

Quote :

"That's what the word codependent was used to avoid. Information does not transmit one way. You're demonstrating a preference to believe it does. Epistemology informs psychology--true--and in like fashion, knowledge derived from psychology also informs epistemology."

Any knowledge of what the mind does that is not self-evident to the philosopher is not accessible in philosophy. I understand and appreciate your attempt at being original here, but you're misapplying the fields.

Quote :

"I fully disagree. As with the social constructions of borders, there are perfectly analytically true statements that render it false. Inconsistency being one. They represent distinctions agreed upon by multiple observers, but are not necessarily "true" things. They have a limitation on the degree of truth assignable to them: "socially constructed truth.""

Provide an interpretation that makes P or not P false.

Quote :

"I'm thinking particle physics could do this better than I can. Here are some attempts: P: Electrons = waves P: Electrons = particles P: Waves cannot be particulate P: Particles cannot be waves In truth, I'm hoping this example is invalid and that you can break down for me why."

It obviously can't be both. This is practical physics -- obviously there's something else at play here that isn't described. The concept of duality is that it acts as both. A reasonable extension of that is not to throw out the basis of logic, but is to assume there's more we don't know about the situation.

Using physics is a piss-poor example, as it changes constantly, doesn't mind if it uses contradiction as long as it "works" (quantum physics/relativity), etc. It's pragmatic -- it'll use what fits the data.

Once again:

Provide an interpretation that does not satisfy P or not P.

9/21/2006 2:19:55 PM

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: I'm glad you said this. They are right BECAUSE they simply describe our impressions. Our impressions ARE our own mental state."

This equates memory with mental state, no?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: If you think, you must necessarily exist. You cannot be deceived about your own existence because if you're being deceived, there must be something to be deceived -- you exist."

This is where existence and essence come into play.

What suggests you think in the first place? Could our brains not be operating according to an "external" clock whose mechanisms we don't quite understand or cannot perceive?

This very position begs the question in itself. Who are you? Who is the "I" behind Descartes proposition? What validates his/her capacity to epistemologically discern conception from deception?

As a side question, what terms define the measurements of our capacity to discern our thoughts from experiences?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Internal mental state: I am currently having the visual experience of seeing a table in front of me. Knowledge that might be wrong: I see a table in front of me."

Agreed, but not an answer to my question.

"Where is the distinction between internal and external knowledge, and why is it made?"

I suppose you could add, "And how?"

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Truth has no degrees. Justification and warrant for believing things has degrees."

I concede the point. It just leads to revising the question, though:

What justifications and warrants are acceptable premises for forming epistemologically sound belief systems?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: This is due to observing phenomena, but being off limits to noumena."

Can the proximity between truth and perception be accurately measured at all?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Perception. (the act of sensing things)"

Right, but is it an "internal or external" process?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Any knowledge of what the mind does that is not self-evident to the philosopher is not accessible in philosophy."

Then how does knowledge become accessible in philosophy?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: I understand and appreciate your attempt at being original here, but you're misapplying the fields."

By challenging the notion that information transfer exists uni-directionally between fields? Or presuming that present philosophy represents truth?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Provide an interpretation that makes P or not P false."

P: Distinctions hold philosophical validity.

Same disclaimer.

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: The concept of duality is that it acts as both."

At all times?

Quote :

"ChknMcFaggot: Provide an interpretation that does not satisfy P or not P."

P: Energy fields.

9/21/2006 2:48:13 PM

Quote :

"This equates memory with mental state, no?"

Only if the memory is currently being recalled or reflected upon. "I have the memory that . . ."

Quote :

"What suggests you think in the first place? Could our brains not be operating according to an "external" clock whose mechanisms we don't quite understand or cannot perceive?"

Because I do. QED. It doesn't matter what physical structures do or not create the mind (or if there is any physical structure that creates the mind) when it comes to philosophical discussion. This is why I think you misapply psychology -- you're getting tripped up on something like that, which doesn't matter. For the sake of a philosophical discussion, the distinction of a mind as a brain doesn't matter. If there is some "external" clockwork as you put it that helps create the mind, then those structures wouldn't be external to the mind as a concept or as an experienced, subjective reality.

Quote :

"This very position begs the question in itself. Who are you? Who is the "I" behind Descartes proposition? What validates his/her capacity to epistemologically discern conception from deception? As a side question, what terms define the measurements of our capacity to discern our thoughts from experiences?"

It's not that it begs the question -- the argument is that some bits of knowledge are non-inferential. Anything that is self-presenting can't be reasoned-to in practice, that's what "non-inferential" would mean.

Your knowledge of psychology here is really obscuring your understanding of the precise philosophical concepts. Whether something is an experience, memory, statement of what I think or what I believe, etc -- as long as the thought is currently occupying the mind, it is self-presenting.

Here's an example: say you have a headache. It's possible you have no good reason to have a headache -- perhaps everything's in working order. It's also possible that your brain as you know it does not exist, along with the rest of your body and everything else you've perceived about the world. However, what CANNOT be mistaken is the sensation of a headache which you are, indeed, experiencing.

Quote :

"Agreed, but not an answer to my question. "Where is the distinction between internal and external knowledge, and why is it made?" I suppose you could add, "And how?""

In this philosophical discussion it doesn't make sense to talk about this in (suspect) physical terms -- we talk in terms of the processes involved. You're absolutely right in the fact that knowledge is a belief that somebody holds, that in addition to other things, is true about the outside world. In this sense, everything would be "internal" in the sense that its property of your mind. However, there's a big difference between "I think there is a table before me" and "there is a table before me." The first is necessarily true, because in thinking and stating it, it is the case. The second one is an inference drawn from the first one (along with some other knowledge -- in my opinion) and might or might not be true.

Quote :

"What justifications and warrants are acceptable premises for forming epistemologically sound belief systems?"

This is a much different question than what we've been addressing. I think that beliefs stemming from (1) sound deduction, (2) scientific induction, and (3) common sensical induction should count, perhaps among other things.

Quote :

"Can the proximity between truth and perception be accurately measured at all?"

I think it makes sense to assume some useful level of proximity. We experience the phenomena of the real world everyday.

Quote :

"Right, but is it an "internal or external" process?"

It's internal, but it allows us to make statements about external reality (which suddenly become contingent -- however, statements of HAVING a perceptual experience are analytic).

Quote :

"By challenging the notion that information transfer exists uni-directionally between fields? Or presuming that present philosophy represents truth?"

First of all, present philosophy doesn't represent absolute truth -- if this were the case, every philosopher would be out of a job and the field would be closed. This does not, however, suggest a weakness in the field.

Second of all, if you're using psychological principles to answer philosophical questions, you're going to end up with a circular argument.

Quote :

" P: Distinctions hold philosophical validity. Same disclaimer."

By "interpretation" it isn't meant that you replace the logical atom with a logically contingent premise. Interpretations are the assignment of truth values to logical atoms.

Again, provide me an interpretation of (P or not P) that does not satisfy it. Analytically true statements are necessarily true, and for a very very straightforward reason that I'm trying to demonstrate here.

Quote :

"At all times?"

I'm not totally familiar with that branch of physics, but what you're talking about are rules that help describe and predict phenomenal events. I'm talking about analytic propositions being necessarily true -- which is far from an original idea of mine. I'm trying to show to you the reason why philosophy has, since Aristotle, known this fact of logic, and haven't thrown it out since then (think about how much of Aristoteleanism has been chucked).

Quote :

"P: Energy fields."

This is not a legal interpretation.

EDIT:

On your confusion with interpretations and why analytic statements are necessarily true:

You think that substituting any premise in for a logical atom is an interpretation. The idea of interpretation is assuming that you simply assign whatever truth value you want to the logical atoms -- if you check all interpretations, you effectively check every possible set that could be encountered.

Replacing the atoms with other atoms doesn't make much sense -- it just gives you another case to consider. It doesn't affect validity, but it might affect soundness based on your substitutions.

[Edited on September 21, 2006 at 4:07 PM. Reason : .]

9/21/2006 4:00:09 PM

Quote :

"However, what CANNOT be mistaken is the sensation of a headache which you are, indeed, experiencing."

Who says it's me that's experiencing it? Especially in the case that everything's in working order?

[Edited on September 22, 2006 at 2:50 PM. Reason : (more upon return, this is becoming a very productive discussion)]

9/22/2006 2:49:58 PM

We're talking about your experiences and your propositions formed about those experiences. It's a way of showing that there's at least some places skepticism can't breach. You're assuming that logic works differently than it does, which is an assumption you can't really make.

9/22/2006 2:51:21 PM

Agree, all truths are based on perception.

9/22/2006 2:54:00 PM

No, I'd argue knowledge is a combination of applying structures and categories of the mind to our senses. That much I'm with, but there are logical necessities that are true regardless of whether there were any minds around to think about them.

The construction itself is, of course, a creation.

9/22/2006 3:09:40 PM

I think logic is a human creation based on perceived reality, so I would argue that it wouldnt exist without the mind.

9/22/2006 5:27:24 PM

That's surely the case in the sense that our internal representations of logic are internal, but analytic truths hold across "all possible universes".

9/22/2006 6:40:35 PM

Such as?

9/23/2006 2:59:10 AM

Analytic truths such as (P or not P).

9/23/2006 3:06:05 AM

Whatever is, is. I think that goes without saying.

9/23/2006 3:47:55 PM

That's not what I'm saying.

Whatever is, is -- but it might not be in "all possible universes". Surely if you see red right now, you can envision a scenario in which you might not see red. It's not a "necessary" truth.

9/23/2006 3:55:26 PM

Did I kill this thread? I'm sorry if I immediately loaded it down with dense terminology and definitions, but I think that these things are important in such a discussion.

9/25/2006 12:27:17 PM

No, I think I just ran myself into a brick wall trying to figure out exactly how to frame the question this thread is supposed to ask. We've gotten locked into a digression of sorts, even a productive one, but it seems like one that could take a thread and a half to explain.

What's an epistemologically sound belief system in which to indoctrinate oneself to achieve whatever the hell we think we're supposed to achieve?

9/25/2006 2:11:17 PM

I thought you were arguing in defense of universal truths, but you responded by saying the opposite.

9/25/2006 2:11:21 PM

Absolutely not. I'd argue in defense of the universal truth of ephemeral experience (we experience an interpretation of reality), and energy fields. That's just about it.

9/25/2006 2:15:29 PM