http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/03/maliki_security_oper.php

Quote :

"Maliki: "Security operations in Basra will continue" By Bill RoggioMarch 31, 2008 3:08 PM One day after Muqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, called for his fighters to abandon combat, the fighting in Basrah has come to a near-halt and the Iraqi security forces are patrolling the streets. While Sadr spokesman said the Iraqi government agreed to Sadr's terms for the ceasefire, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki has said the security forces will continue operations in Basrah in the south. Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army took heavy casualties in Basrah, Nasiriyah, Babil, and Baghdad over the weekend, despite Sadr's call for the end of fighting. Maliki was clear that operations would continue in the South. "The armed groups who refuse al Sadr's announcement and the pardon we offered will be targets, especially those in possession of heavy weapons," Maliki said, referring to the 10 day amnesty period for militias to turn in heavy and medium weapons. "Security operations in Basra will continue to stop all the terrorist and criminal activities along with the organized gangs targeting people." The Iraqi military said it was moving in more forces into the south after admitting it was surprised by the level of resistance encountered in Basrah. "Fresh military reinforcements were sent to Basra to start clearing a number of Basra districts of wanted criminals and gunmen taking up arms," said Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al Ubaidi, the operations chief for the Ministry of Defense. "Preparations for fresh operations have been made to conduct raids and clearance operations in Basra... the military operations would continue to restore security in Basra." The reasons behind Sadr's call for a cessation in fighting remain unknown, but reports indicate the Mahdi Army was having a difficult time sustaining its operations and has taken heavy casualties. "Whatever gains [the Mahdi Army] has made in the field [in Basrah], they were running short of ammunition, food, and water," an anonymous US military officer serving in South told The Long War Journal. "In short [the Mahdi Army] had no ability to sustain the effort. TIME's sources in Basrah paint a similar picture. "There has been a large-scale retreat of the Mahdi Army in the oil-rich Iraqi port city because of low morale and because ammunition is low due to the closure of the Iranian border," the magazine reported. McClatchy Newspapers indicated a member of the Maliki's Dawa party and the leader of the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, traveled to Qom, Iran to lobby Qods Forces officers to get Sadr to halt the fighting. The trip "had two aims, lawmakers said: to ask Sadr to stand down his militia and to ask Iranian officials to stop supplying weapons to Shiite militants in Iraq." The two men met with Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Qods Force, the foreign special operations branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. The Mahdi Army has also taken high casualties since the fighting began on March 25. According to an unofficial tally of the open source reporting from the US and Iraqi media and Multinational Forces Iraq, 571 Mahdi Army fighters have been killed, 881 have been wounded, 490 have been captured, and 30 have surrendered over the course of seven days of fighting. Baghdad There have been few reports of clashes in the Shia districts of New Baghdad, Sadr City, and elsewhere on Monday. US and Iraqi security forces killed 48 Mahdi Army fighters during a series of clashes throughout Baghdad on Sunday. US and Iraqi security forces captured at least 22 Mahdi Army fighters in Baghdad. Twenty of those were captured in Sadr City. An unknown number of Mahdi Army fighters in the Iskan and Washash neighborhoods have gone against Sadr's demands to keep their weapons and have surrendered them to the military in accordance with the amnesty offer issued by Maliki. The Iraqi government has lifted the curfew for much of Baghdad, but Sadr City remains under curfew. "Terrorist groups are trying to exploit the current situation, and target the residential compounds there," said Dr. Ali al Dabbagh, the spokesman for the Iraqi government. Today, Mahdi fighters targeted the International Zone in central Baghdad with mortars and rockets. No casualties have been reported. The official spokesperson for the Baghdad Health directorate for eastern Baghdad said 109 people have been killed and 634 wounded during the past week of fighting. "This is only in Sadr city, and according to the statistics from the two local hospitals Imam Ali and al Sadr," Qassim Mohammed told Voices of Iraq. Basrah The Mahdi Army has vacated the streets of Basrah and the Iraqi security forces have begun to reassert control throughout the city. Fighting in Basrah has been fierce, with the Mahdi Army putting up stiff resistance in some neighborhoods it controlled prior to Sadr's call for the end of fighting. Prior to the end of fighting, Iraqi security forces overran the eastern neighborhood of Tanuma and surrounded the central Timimiyah neighborhood as US and British forces pounded Mahdi Army positions, McClatchy Newspapers reported. "But the Iraqi security forces still couldn't penetrate the vast Shiite slum of Hayaniyah or al Qibla, two Mahdi Army stronghold of Basra." Some Mahdi Army fighters said they would continue to fight Iraqi security forces despite Sadr's orders. The Mahdi Army has also taken heavy casualties in Basrah. "The Iraqi security agencies killed 210 gunmen, including 42 dangerous criminals, while 600 others were wounded and 155 captured since the commencement of a military campaign in Basra," Major General Abdul Kareem Khalaf told Voices of Iraq on Monday. "Security agencies seized a large amount of weapons including developed explosive charges, and dismantled three car bombs and 80 improvised explosive devices (IEDs)." Nasiriyah After days of heavy fighting, the strategic city of Nasiriyah is under control of the Iraqi government, a US military officer told The Long War Journal. "Nasiriyah is approximately 90% under the control of the Iraqi security forces," the officer said. The Iraqi forces have only received assistance from a small team of US advisers assigned to the police. The government has ordered the curfew to be eased in the southern city, while a Sadrist leader called for followers to "abide by [Sadr's] directives" and put an end to the fighting. The Mahdi Army took heavy casualties in the fighting for Nasiriyah, according to the provincial governor of Dhi Qhar. More than 85 fighters were killed, 200 were wounded, and 100 were arrested, said Governor Aziz Alwan, noting that the figures have not been finalized. Seven police were reported killed and 44 wounded during the fighting. Twenty-eight 28 civilians were killed and 60 wounded, many after the Mahdi Army launched mortar attacks on a civilian neighborhood. The Dhi Qhar police has relieved a police unit of its duties, Voices of Iraq reported. "A 60-memebr police unit was sacked in al Fajr district, 100 km north Nasiriyah for neglecting their duty during the clashes with armed groups," the deputy commander of the provincial police said. It is not clear if the police unit refused to fight or sided with the Mahdi Army. "

3/31/2008 3:27:57 PM

you know if salisburyboy had a thread where all he did was constantly copy&paste "updates" from prisonplanet he'd surely have been suspended after 4 pages.

people can check the website for updates themselves. i was always under the impression that to be a viable SB thread you had to add some commentary or get a discussion started....not just copy/paste

[Edited on March 31, 2008 at 5:30 PM. Reason : .]

3/31/2008 5:29:54 PM

He is linking and copying from multiple sites, and in many of his posts he adds commentary.

I think this thread is very informative, and I don't understand all the hate for a thread that lends first-party perspective of the war.

3/31/2008 5:49:14 PM

You are my boy. MY FUCKING BOY BLUE!

thank god people understand that people who come to this thread dont have all the information out there already bookmarked in their browser. and please if you guys find info you think is informative or important about Iraq, go ape shit so I dont have to keep padding

especially since when we are winning the media doesnt want to have and good come from it to make republicans look better....rabble rabble rabble

[Edited on March 31, 2008 at 8:34 PM. Reason : das]

3/31/2008 8:29:57 PM

Quote :

"I don't understand all the hate for a thread that lends first-party perspective of the war."

3/31/2008 9:22:21 PM

I am just glad this clash came before the elections so it doesn’t cause to much pressure on the election process. There was going to be a clash at some point. This was a good time to have it. I bet another will take place before the Mahdi army is dismantled completely.

This proves that the Iraqi government was successfully marginalizing the Mahdi Army and this was probably an effort to show the government it had some sort of hold on Iraq. This obviously failed. This was a good thing in proving that the government is an effective fighting force vs poorly trained militia and can successfully maneuver in combat with limited US and British help.

Government has shown it can act quickly and will not let violence erupt without a decisive response.

[Edited on April 1, 2008 at 4:20 PM. Reason : fhg]

4/1/2008 4:18:58 PM

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080406/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_isolating_the_sadrists

This was yesterday

Quote :

"Iraq: Sadr party faces rising isolation By HAMZA HENDAWI and QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA, Associated Press Writers Sun Apr 6, 4:01 PM ET BAGHDAD - Iraq's major Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties have closed ranks to force anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to disband his Mahdi Army militia or leave politics, lawmakers and officials involved in the effort said Sunday. Such a bold move risks a violent backlash by al-Sadr's Shiite militia. But if it succeeds it could cause a major realignment of Iraq's political landscape. The first step will be adding language to a draft election bill banning parties that operate militias from fielding candidates in provincial balloting this fall, the officials and lawmakers said. The government intends to send the draft to parliament within days and hopes to win approval within weeks. "We, the Sadrists, are in a predicament," lawmaker Hassan al-Rubaie said Sunday. "Even the blocs that had in the past supported us are now against us and we cannot stop them from taking action against us in parliament." Al-Sadr controls 30 of the 275 parliament seats, a substantial figure but not enough to block legislation. Al-Rubaie said the threat was so serious that a delegation might have to discuss the issue with al-Sadr in person. The young cleric, who has disappeared from the public eye for nearly a year, is believed to be in the Iranian holy city of Qom. In a rare public signal of dissent in Sadrist ranks, al-Rubaie complained that "those close" to al-Sadr "are radicals and that poses problems," suggesting that some of the cleric's confidants may be urging him toward a showdown. "We must go and explain to him in person that there's a problem," he said. U.S. officials have been pressing Iraq's government for years to disband the militias, including the Mahdi Army. All major political parties are believed to maintain links to armed groups, although none acknowledge it. Some groups, including militias of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa party and al-Sadr's chief rival, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, have been integrated into the government security services. That put them nominally under the government's authority, although they are believed to maintain ties to the political parties and retain their command structures. Uprisings in 2004 by al-Sadr's militiamen ended through mediation by top Shiite clerics. Shiite leaders then attempted to bring the Sadrists into the political mainstream, offering them Cabinet posts and deferring to them on some major security issues. But attacks by Shiite extremists continued, allegedly carried out by pro-Iranian splinter groups. The militia issue took on new urgency after al-Maliki launched a major operation March 25 against Shiite extremists in Basra and fighting quickly spread from the southern port city to Baghdad and elsewhere. The Sadrists believed the Basra crackdown was aimed at weakening their movement before the fall elections. They insisted al-Maliki was encouraged to move against them by their chief Shiite rivals — the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. U.S. and Iraqi officials insist the crackdown is directed at criminal gangs and splinter groups supported by Iran. Al-Sadr ordered his fighters off the streets March 30 under a deal brokered in Iran. But the truce left the militia intact and armed and did not address the long-term threat. "We want the Sadrists to disband the Mahdi Army. Just freezing it is no longer acceptable," said Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior adviser to al-Maliki. "The new election law will prevent any party that has weapons or runs a militia from contesting elections." Broad outlines of the strategy to combat the militias were made public late Saturday in a statement by the Political Council for National Security, a top leadership body including the national president, prime minister and leaders of major parties in parliament. The statement called on parties to disband their militias or face a political ban. Although the statement did not mention the Sadrists, the intent was clear. President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, said Sunday that the statement was adopted after "heated, cordial, frank and transparent discussion," Al-Rubaie and another Sadrist lawmaker who attended objected to the call for militias to disband, he said. Al-Rubaie confirmed Talabani's account and said "our political isolation was very clear and real during the meeting." Kurdish lawmaker Mahmoud Othman said the Sadrists must either disband the militia "or face the Americans." He was alluding to the possibility of full-scale U.S. military involvement if al-Sadr refuses to disband his militia and the government decides to disarm it by force. Al-Sadr has called on supporters to stage a "million-strong" protest in Baghdad on Wednesday to mark the fifth anniversary of the city's capture by U.S. troops. "We will watch it carefully," said Reda Jawad Taqi, a senior member of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. "

Another below

4/7/2008 1:44:25 PM

^new as well

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080407/wl_nm/iraq_dc

This is right today, right now even.

Quote :

"Iraq's Sadr to disband Mehdi Army if clerics order By Khaled Farhan 3 minutes ago NAJAF, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr offered on Monday to disband his militia if the highest Shi'ite religious authority demands it, a shock announcement at a time when the group is the focus of an upsurge in fighting. The news came after Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who launched a crackdown on Sadr's Mehdi Army late last month, ordered the cleric to disband his militia or face exclusion from the Iraqi political process. It was the first time Sadr has evoked dissolving the Mehdi Army, whose black-masked fighters have been principle actors throughout Iraq's five-year-old war and the main foes of U.S. and Iraqi forces in widespread battles over recent weeks. Senior Sadr aide Hassan Zargani said Sadr would seek rulings from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most senior Shi'ite cleric, as well as senior Shi'ite clergy based in Iran, on whether to dissolve the Mehdi Army, and would obey their orders. "If they order the Mehdi Army to disband, Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr movement will obey the orders of the religious leaders," Zargani told Reuters from neighboring Iran, where U.S. officials say Sadr has spent most of the past year. That puts the spotlight on the reclusive Sistani, 77, a cleric revered by all of Iraq's Shi'ite factions and whose edicts carry the force of Islamic law. Sistani, who almost never leaves his house in Najaf, has intervened in Iraqi politics only a handful of times but on each occasion his rulings have been decisive. Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said he could not comment on the statement by Sadr's aide. Sistani's spokesman, Hamed al-Khafaf, declined to comment. The developments come at a pivotal time, two days before Sadr has called a million followers onto the streets for anti-American demonstrations and one day before the top U.S. officials in Iraq are due to brief Congress on progress. Sadr has a history of allowing his militia to show its strength, then pulling back unexpectedly from confrontation. A move to formally disband the Mehdi Army could help Sadr win prestige among a public exhausted by fighting. "Sadr's decision will gain him respect among followers as a leader who is ready to sacrifice for his supporters' safety," said Iraqi political science lecturer Hazem al-Nuaimi. But it is hard to imagine the gunmen disappearing from Iraqi neighborhoods any time soon, said Joost Hiltermann, Iraq expert at the International Crisis Group think tank. "In a vacuum like the current one, militias thrive because they are necessary. They protect Sadr's people against sectarian attacks by Sunni insurgents and against the Shi'ite middle class which doesn't want Sadrists to get a share of power," he said. Maliki ordered a crackdown on the militia two weeks ago in the southern city of Basra, provoking clashes throughout Baghdad and the Shi'ite south that led to the country's worst fighting since at least the first half of 2007. That fighting ebbed a week ago when Sadr ordered the militia off the streets, but picked up again on Sunday with clashes around the Mehdi Army stronghold of Sadr City, a Baghdad slum. In an interview broadcast on Monday, Maliki singled out the Mehdi Army by name for the first time and ordered it to disband. "Solving the problem comes in no other way than dissolving the Mehdi Army," Maliki told U.S. network CNN. "They no longer have a right to participate in the political process or take part in the upcoming elections unless they end the Mehdi Army." He said government troops would continue the Sadr City crackdown: "We have opened the door for confrontation, a real confrontation with these gangs, and we will not stop until we are in full control of these areas." Fighting continued in Baghdad on Monday, although not with the same intensity as Sunday's clashes. U.S. military spokesman Major Mark Cheadle said U.S. helicopters on Monday fired Hellfire missiles into Sadr City and the New Baghdad district, where a fixed-wing fighter also dropped a bomb on a mortar firing position. "People were heading to the mosque for prayers when a helicopter fired from overhead," said Hussein al-Rubaie, a worker in Sadr City, where hospital sources said the strike killed four. "Dead and wounded were lying all over the ground." Iraqi police said nine people died in a missile strike in the Amin district of eastern Baghdad, but it was not clear whether the missile was fired from the air or ground. The U.S. military said one of its soldiers had been killed by small arms fire while on patrol in eastern Baghdad on Monday. Seven U.S. soldiers were killed on Sunday, one of the deadliest days for American forces in months. (Additional reporting by Noah Barkin, Ahmed Rasheed and Peter Graff; Writing by Peter Graff; editing by Dean Yates and Mary Gabriel) "

Anyone thinking the surge is not working? Anyone still thinking the US army isnt winning the morality war with the people?

One thing that I might not have shown is that, during the past 6 months, civilians have learned specifically that the soldiers of the US army are particularly just when it comes to right and wrong. If there is a dispute, they fix it in a moral just way and make progress winning over the people by just being who they are. Iraqis have been trained to lie cheat and not trust anyone under Sadam. The US army had to show the people what it is like to clearly have right and wrong rules. This is one reason alot of the people still don’t trust the Iraqi security forces. They know that Iraqis are not a trustworthy as the Americans. But this will become less and less a problem as the people see the Iraqi forces doing more and more of the work like they did the past 2 weeks across the country.

4/7/2008 1:45:02 PM

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/04/iraqi_security_force_12.php

If anyone is interested in how the Iraqi Army is forming as far as divisions and unit break down, here is a good link.

4/7/2008 2:53:06 PM

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/04/a_look_at_operation_1.php

This article clearly shows what happened to cause the initial push in Basra to stall.

In addition, it further demonstrates how retarded the mainstream media is declaring the operation a major loss for the Iraqi government.

Regardless, this website is excellent.

4/7/2008 3:14:49 PM

Quote :

"After the town hall meeting in Fallujah, Mukhtar Hamid Hussein approached Captain Eastin. “We appreciate the security you provide to us,” he said. “And how you watch over us as we also protect you.” Mukhtar Hussein was the chief of Fallujah’s mukhtars. “For a long time we were enemies. But now we are friends.” “It was a miscommunication,” Captain Eastin said. That was a serious and generous understatement. “There were mistakes on both sides,” Mukhtar Hussein said. “But now we are brothers.”"

Mukhtar Hamid Hussein

I would like to point out that the miscommunication retoric is common on both sides. This is because of the complete misunderstanding of why the soldiers were there, and the failed strategy before Petraeus. In addition, the foreign fighters and Insurgents spread nothing but anti American retoric when they were in control, convincing the populace that we were evil. Now that the populace is no longer under the boots of AQI and company, they can judge for themselves. And this is where the morality war comes into play as I mentioned earlier.

Here are some other quotes from this article that I see as informative.

Quote :

"Gasperetti is “just” a corporal. And he's in charge of building a school. He's responsible for flipping a Baath Party functionary into the American column. And he's younger than I was when I finished college."

Apparantly a corporal is just above private. The magnitude of what needs to be fixed means that even low ranking personel need to take on jobs they have no training in and they make it all up as they go along. Some officers do have some training in this, but not on this scale.

Quote :

"Iraqis will often Iraqify, so to speak, ideas that Americans come up with. When Americans and Iraqis put their heads together they often resolve problems in ways that neither would have thought of on their own. “Iraqi solutions are sometimes weird,” Captain Glenn said. “But it's almost always more effective than the Western solution we would come up with.” “Give me an example of a weird solution,” I said. “Some of the day labor projects,” he said. “We give a little bit of money to unemployed guys for some work, like cleaning the streets, rubble removal, things like that. You and I might say, hey, let's get some people and go out there and we'll pay them. They'll do that, but they just go about it in a really roundabout sort of way. They'll hire a couple of people to pick up trash, but then they'll just pick up a little trash and then go paint barriers or something. Meanwhile I'll be thinking, let's just go pick up rubble and trash. They are very non-linear. Also, like providing the trash cans. We purchased some trash cans. We wracked our brains about the accountability of the trash cans – we were thinking militaristically about accountability, the ten digit grid and where, exactly, these trash cans should go. The mukhtars said here's what we'll do. We'll get these trash cans and we'll talk to the senior man, the elder or the hajji in the area where the trash cans will go. We'll have him sign for it, then it's his trash can and he manages the trash can. That's not something we would have thought of.” "

One thing that I read a while back basically said that the American military is becoming the most effective counter insurgency force on the planet. The lessons learned in Iraq will be taught for generations in military courses.

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 9:03 AM. Reason : ff]

4/8/2008 9:01:59 AM

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/04/iraqi_government_mov.php

Quote :

"Less than two weeks after Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki launched Operation Knights' Assault to clear the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backer militias in Basrah, the Iraqi government is moving to ban Muqtada al Sadr's political movement from participating in the election if it fails to disband the militia. Facing near-unanimous opposition, Sadr said he would seek guidance from senior Shia clerics in Najaf and Qom and disband the Mahdi Army if told to do so, according to one aide. But another Sadr aide denied this"

I think the term, "pwnt", applies here.

They have effectively diminished Sadr's(Iran's) militia force and are now trying to marginalize their political influence as well.

This.Is.A.Government.Making.Progress.

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 9:23 AM. Reason : ly]



MORE FOR YOU

http://instapundit.com/archives2/017551.php

Quote :

"April 08, 2008 AUSTIN BAY: No, Sadr did not win. "The quick damnation of PM Maliki and the Iraqi Army’s efforts last week reveals an immense ignorance of warfare, one still rampant despite six-plus years of alleged experience; it displays not simply hasty, herd-mentality judgmentalism, but demonstrates in trump cards the sensationalist, fear-leveraging slant of most media coverage." Related item here. "On the political front, Sadr now finds himself completely isolated." "

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 9:48 AM. Reason : dsf]

4/8/2008 9:21:56 AM

Disenfranchising entire voting blocs?

Hell yes this is democracy at work!

GO IRAQ GO!

Also, let's go ahead and bar any members of the militias in the Pacific NW from voting in '08. We can call it part of our own political progress.

4/8/2008 10:11:07 AM

Yes, disenfranchising Iran supported blocs is bad for Iraq.

Spin it like your media gods.

4/8/2008 10:13:26 AM

How about...

Disenfranchising ANY Iraqi voting blocs is bad for Iraq.

This is another step toward making peaceful revolution impossible in Iraq. Wonder how that turns out long term...

Hey, at least the Iranians would be powerful allies against Al Qaeda. But who cares. They're all brown, I guess.

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 10:30 AM. Reason : media gods lol]

4/8/2008 10:28:28 AM

I dont think you realize how unpopular Sadr and his army are.

4/8/2008 10:29:33 AM

I don't think it matters.

A citizen's ability to vote in a participatory Democracy doesn't and shouldn't extend from his or her popularity.

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 10:50 AM. Reason : best of luck digging your way out of this gem of a Democratic ideal...]

4/8/2008 10:35:22 AM

People under Sadr's flag have been intimidating murdering raping etc. Not to mention the criminal gangs associated with him. Its not like this organization is acting in any way democratic or in anyway legally on the streets to garner proper success through democratic channels

4/8/2008 12:50:08 PM

Quote :

"Transcript: Report To Congress On The Situation In Iraq By General David H. Petraeus General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee April 8, 2008 GEN. PETRAEUS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command. Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi security force elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional forces to Iraq. A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been made... First, of course, has been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces. You're well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its capability to deploy and employ these forces. A second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, and to combat criminal elements and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress. Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni Awakening in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have rejected Al Qaeda-Iraq's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These communities also recognize that they could not share in Iraq's bounty if they didn't participate in the political arena. Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis, some former insurgents, to contribute to local security as so-called Sons of Iraq. With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of Al Qaeda- Iraq, the threat posed by AQI, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced significantly. The recent flare-up in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the cease-fire declared by Muqtada al- Sadr last fall, another factor in the overall reduction in violence. Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr stand-down resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming and directing the so-called special groups, and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the special groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq. As we look to the future, our task, together with our Iraqi partners, will be to build on the progress achieved and to deal with the many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces. In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This completion continues, influenced heavily by outside actors. And its resolution remains the key to producing long- term stability in Iraq. Various elements push Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminal gangs pose significant threats. Al Qaeda's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq's challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports Al Qaeda-Iraq. And Iran has fueled the violence, as I noted, in a particularly damaging way through its lethal support to the special groups. Finally, insufficient Iraqi government capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust and corruption add to Iraq's problems. These challenges and recent weeks' violence notwithstanding, Iraq's ethno-sectarian competitions in many areas is now taking place more through debate and less through violence. In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with, temporary (sic) at least, by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is through political dialogue rather than street fighting. As I stated at the outset, though Iraq remains a violent country, we do see progress in the security arena. As this chart illustrates, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level not seen since early to mid 2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the fighting in Basra and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one. As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence. As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007. This chart also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition and Iraqi data, and the bottom line reflecting coalition-confirmed data only. No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly, though more work clearly needs to be done. Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box in the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor has been the reduction of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown in the boxes depicting Iraq's capital over time. Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial explanation, as countless sectarian fault lines in numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in Baghdad and elsewhere. In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their local communities. As this next chart shows, even though the number of high-profile attacks increased in March as Al Qaeda lashed out, the current level of attacks like this remains far below its height a year ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence, in particular, has remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy's inability to date to reignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence. The emergence of Iraqi volunteers to help secure their local communities has been an important development. As this chart depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq, Shia as well as Sunni, under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings and vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved have far outweighed the costs of their monthly contracts. Sons of Iraq have also have contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches. As this next chart shows, in fact we have already found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we're working closely with the Iraqi government to transition them into the Iraqi security forces or other forms of employment. And over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police or army or other government jobs. This process has been slow but it is taking place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully. Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and AQI elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks, in addition to AQI's use of women, children and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated Al Qaeda-Iraq from the Iraqi people. And the tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI's loss of local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capabilities, numbers, and freedom of movement. This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against Al Qaeda-Iraq and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we've reduced considerably the areas in which Al Qaeda enjoys support and sanctuary, though clearly there is more to be done. "

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 1:23 PM. Reason : jibba]

4/8/2008 1:20:45 PM

Quote :

"Having noted that progress, Al Qaeda is still capable of lethal attacks. And we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside of Iraq that support it and on the resource flows that sustain it. This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what Al Qaeda-Iraq needs. As you can see, defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces, but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles and detainee operations, and many other actions. Related to this effort, I applaud Congress' support for additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming supplemental, as ISR is vital to the success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere. As we combat AQI we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens an organization that Al Qaeda's senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Osama bin laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen Al Qaeda-Iraq involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mideast region. Together with the Iraqi security forces we have also focused on the special groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed and directed by Iran's Quds Force with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions in response. Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to the promises made by President Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the special groups. However, nefarious activities by the Quds Force have continued and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq. The Iraqi security forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, not just the successful ones in the Kurdish regional government area but also a number of southern provinces, have done well. Challenges have emerged in some other, including of course Basra. Nonetheless, this process will continue and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to transition in the months ahead. Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi security forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100. These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi security losses have recently been three times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they get their footing and gained a degree of confluence. And certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable. Underpinning the advances of the past year has been improvements in Iraq's security institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi security forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still-expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 army and special operations battalions through the rest of 2008, along with 23,000 police and eight national police battalions. Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund. We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year. And this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. While improved Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the country on their own, recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi security forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies and replacements on very short notice. They certainly could not have deployed a division's worth of army and police units on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the area of logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control. We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the organizations and the FMS progress -- process delivery has improved, as the FMS system has strived to support urgent war-time requirements. On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider restoring funding for the International Military Education and Training program which supports education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders and is an important component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future. While security has improved in many areas, and the Iraqi security forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a resurgence of Al Qaeda-Iraq, or additional Shia groups could violate Muqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire order and return to violence. External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq and actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well. Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security, which has provided opportunities for political and economic progress and improved services at the local, provincial and national levels. But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will continue. In the coming months, Iraq leaders must strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would challenge any government, much less a still-developing government tested by war. The Commander's Emergency Response Program, the State Department's Quick Response Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced security in local communities. "

4/8/2008 1:21:15 PM

Quote :

"Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300 million for us to manage as Iraqi CERP to perform projects for their people, while building their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small-business loans, and $196 million for a joint training and reintegration program. The Iraqi government pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed two months ago. Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources continue even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours. Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains, while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permits but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been made. As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that: the military surge has achieved progress, but that that progress is reversible; Iraqi security forces have strengthened their capabilities, but still must grow further; the provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundaries disputes and Article 140 issues will be very challenging; the transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security forces or other pursuits will require time and careful monitoring; withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year; and performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces, as well as special operation forces and adviser teams. The strategic considerations include recognition that: the strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable; a number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats; a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the efforts to counter malign Iranian influence. After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown in the surge to the combat forces and that upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and over time determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions. This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit. This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable, however it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still-fragile security gains our troopers have fought so far and sacrifice so much to achieve. With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our national interests to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies. In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our nation in Iraq. We have asked a great deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my recommendations. The Congress, the executive branch and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved ones. And all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more to those in harm's way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families. Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women serving our nation in Iraq and in the courage, determination, resilience and initiative they demonstrate each and every day. It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them. Thank you very much."

4/8/2008 1:21:36 PM

tl;dr

Quote :

"BEU: People under Sadr's flag have been intimidating murdering raping etc. Not to mention the criminal gangs associated with him. Its not like this organization is acting in any way democratic or in anyway legally on the streets to garner proper success through democratic channels"

Got it. So you defeat tyranny by becoming more like the tyrants. Brilliant.

4100 More Years!!!1

4/8/2008 4:31:39 PM

Sigh, I think you make ignorant statements like that for the hell of it.

4/8/2008 6:38:04 PM

I work with what you give me. Perhaps we ought disenfranchise every neighborhood kid that's ever thrown up a Crip or Blood sign to look hard. It's just as legitimate.

You're honestly defending disenfranchisement to foster a Democracy. Of a particularly angry group of citizens who desire political change, to boot.

How is describing that as the act of a tyrannical government ignorant?

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 7:50 PM. Reason : these boots are made for freedom...]

4/8/2008 7:48:19 PM

I think the fact that the entire Iraqi parliament (outside of the sadr party, duh) agreed to this underscores the fact that the Sadr movement is not a positive force for anyone or anything in Iraq. It is not even going to be allowed to participate in the provincial elections if it keeps the militia intact. I mean, did you miss the part where the mahdi army was a bad thing? Bad for the political process, bad for getting closer to solving problems with debate rather than saber rattling.

4/8/2008 9:32:19 PM

And did you miss the part where they still were citizens with a stake in the nature of their homeland?

You're simply defending the tyranny of the majority. A concept I'll leave you to look up on your own.

Christ. This is just fucking ridiculous. I'm done arguing. I don't know what you claim to defend or advance when you suit up, but don't dare call it democracy. Democracies let their citizens vote, regardless of political allegiance. Even fucking Nazis get to vote in the United States.

[Edited on April 8, 2008 at 11:24 PM. Reason : done done done]

4/8/2008 11:21:24 PM

I am defending the prime ministers ability to defend his government from being shelled in the green zone.

This isn’t some green happy land where everyone is holding hands and the Iraqi government decides to shoot someone in the head. This is a movement by a few against the government with support from Iran that results in the deaths of government soldiers police and citizens. Nothing in Iraq is ideal, nothing in Iraq is easy.

These forces specifically targets by the continued raids are more criminal elements and forces trained in Iran than any kind of legitimate body. I don’t give a damn if you are worried the prime minister used force. Petraeus and Crocker both said multiple times yesterday that the backlash against Iran after these events proves to everyone in Iraq about Iran's intentions and dealings in the south. The central government has to show that it can defend itself from incursions like these and will do so to protect the people of Iraq. It is very good that this happened against legitimate enemies to the state of Iraq and not some time later when it is more ambiguous.

The parliament decided as a body that these actions needed to take place. The government is functioning like it needs to get the confidence of the people.

4/9/2008 9:24:53 AM

Quote :

"You're simply defending the tyranny of the majority. A concept I'll leave you to look up on your own."

4/9/2008 12:19:17 PM

Quote :

"Tyranny of the majority The phrase tyranny of the majority, used in discussing systems of democracy and majority rule, is a criticism of the scenario in which decisions made by a majority under that system would place that majority's interests so far above a minority's interest as to be comparable in cruelty to "tyrannical" despots."

Yes, going after criminals, gangs, and Iranian trained militia that would seek the destruction or severe weakening of an elected government is Tyrannical.

sigh

[Edited on April 9, 2008 at 6:13 PM. Reason : I decided to not eye roll you. ]

4/9/2008 6:01:41 PM

Who said not to go after them, Mr. Strawman?

All I said was to protect their right to have a say in the future of their own governance. Disenfranchising political groups is the very definition of tyranny and the only way to ensure they turn violent. Not that Sadr's boys need an incentive in that department, but why fan the flames?

Quote :

""We haven't turned any corners. We haven't seen any lights at the end of the tunnel""

-Gen. Petraeus, Yesterday



I see he was also all ready to mention the significance of the Sadr ceasefire all of a sudden.

[Edited on April 9, 2008 at 7:02 PM. Reason : ...]

4/9/2008 7:00:57 PM

Maybe.

JUST MAYBE...

Seeing the outrage about China's long occupation of Tibet is making it sink in to the Commander.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24034202/

This is either light from the end of a dark tunnel, or preparation for an invasion of Iran. For now, I'll just breathe a sigh and wait.

4/10/2008 2:58:04 AM

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/04/ayatollah_sistani_on.php

Quote :

"Ayatollah Sistani on the Mahdi Army: “the law is the only authority in the country”"

I believe the goal of the government is to get rid of the Mahdi army. This is the main problem they have with the Sadr movement. Having its own militia allows the sadr movement leverage no other political blocs have, which is probably a large reason they have all sided against the Sadr movement on this issue.

4/10/2008 8:34:00 AM

Quote :

"Al Sadr was not clever in taking this decision inasmuch as he was searching for a cover after he realized that Tehran’s government had abandoned him. This was especially confirmed when the Iranian Foreign Ministry asserted that it was supporting Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s government in Iraq in ‘Knight’s Assault’ [military operation] – which automatically means that it is against al Sadr. It’s clear that al Sadr now knows that Iran is against him and that it would rather have a loyal government than a militia, and thus he had little recourse but to resort to religious authorities after he was abandoned by Tehran’s politicians. "

http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=12361

Quote :

"And then again it may not be bad reporting. Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal notes Sadr’s mouthpieces are sending conflicting signals on whether he even planned to ask Sistani and the other Shiite cleric leaders. That confusion in the PR game may indicate the Sadr movement is on the verge of collapsing."

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/04/clashes_continue_in.php

4/10/2008 11:30:40 AM

Iraqi Politicial Tells the Truth

4/10/2008 3:49:24 PM

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120787343563306609.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries

Quote :

"This leads us to the most out-of-date aspect of the Senate debate: the argument about the pace of troop withdrawals. Precisely because we have made so much political progress in the past year, rather than talking about force reduction, Congress should be figuring ways and means to increase troop levels. For all our successes, we still do not have enough troops. This makes the fight longer and more lethal for the troops who are fighting. To give one example, I just returned this week from Nineveh province, where I have spent probably eight months between 2005 to 2008, and it is clear that we remain stretched very thin from the Syrian border and through Mosul. Vast swaths of Nineveh are patrolled mostly by occasional overflights."

He has been in Iraq longer than any journalist alive....

4/11/2008 8:20:35 AM

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/11/world/middleeast/11sadrcity.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&ei=5118&en=5984fb04d27c221f&ex=1365652800&partner=rssaol&emc=rss

This author is not overly critical of the war or the US troops. I doubt he will be working much longer at the Times.

Quote :

"The struggle for control of Sadr City is more than a test of wills with renegade Shiite militias. It has also become a testing ground for the Iraqi military, which has been thrust into the lead... Iraqi politics has played a role in shaping the military strategy. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has decreed that American ground forces should not push into the heart of Sadr City, according to a senior American officer. American commanders also want to limit the United States’ profile in an area that has long been a bastion of support for Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric. "

4/11/2008 9:34:13 AM

http://instapundit.com/archives2/017730.php

Quote :

"The Iraqi army and Iraqi government planned and executed the operation themselves. Failure? Don't think so. This is progress. As time passes, it is increasingly clear the Iraqi army did a far better job than the Shia gangsters. But we all know why the complex chart gets ignored and successes are glasses half-empty: A presidential election campaign is on, and the Democratic Party has bet its soul on defeat. "Hear no progress in Iraq, see no progress in Iraq, but most of all speak of no progress in Iraq." Thus Sen. Joe Lieberman, a member of the Armed Services Committee, deftly summed the last two years of Democratic Party posturing as well as the Democrats' talking points in the latest hearings. Mr. Lieberman's maverick pal, Sen. and Republican presidential nominee John McCain, spoke more bluntly, "Congress should not choose to lose in Iraq, but we should choose to succeed." "

[Edited on April 11, 2008 at 3:29 PM. Reason : jj]

4/11/2008 3:28:35 PM

http://www.ace.mu.nu/

Quote :

"Ted Kennedy had a bit of snark himself, noting that when violence is increasing and we appear to be losing hope of a victory, Bush says we have to stay the course, and when violence subsides and we appear to be on the verge of actual, unambiguous victory, Bush also says we have to stay the course. He presents this as some sort of a contradiction, when in fact the same imperative runs through both: We cannot afford to lose in Iraq and indeed have a fair chance of a cataclysmic victory. Cataclysmic for Al Qaeda and Islamist lunatics, I mean. But what is the imperative that runs through both of Kennedy's flip-side claims, to wit, that we must withdraw when violence is increasing and hope of victory seems diminshed, and also that we must withdraw when violence is subsiding and hope of victory seems... well, rather hopeful, actually? On the first point, I can't fault him: If a situation looks dire and unwinnable, withdrawal may in fact be the best of a pile of bad options. But how about on that second point? Is he saying that when a situation looks like it might actually result in a major victory, we should still withdrawal and force a sure defeat on ourselves? What possible logic animates that latter proposition, except for the obvious, the viciously partisan position that sacrifices national security (not to mention the fate of millions of Iraqis) to the ostensibly greater moral imperative that Bush must be repudiated and America soundly defeated in order for the Democrats to prosper politically? A house burned, but the heroic efforts of Americans (and Iraqis, and also Austrialians and Czechs and Poles and, earlier, Brits) put out the blaze almost completely, so that the house still stands and only small pockets of fire crackle here and thee to threaten it. Bush (and McCain, and Hillary and Obama too, sometimes) say "Well, gee, maybe we should put out those fires once and for all so that this house may stand forever." Ted Kennedy is saying "Let the winds and circumstance play with the flames and let's see if we cannot invite the inferno once again. Just... to see if we can get it to burn." Bush and Kennedy both have clear and consistent positions on the War in Iraq. Neither is engaged in contradiction or inconsistency whatsoever. It's just that Bush always wants to win the War in Iraq, whatever the circumstances, even when they are the most dire, and Kennedy always wants to lose the War in Iraq, whatever the circumstances, even when they are the most hopeful and victory seems almost in reach. They're both consistent. There is no hypocrisy on either man's part. But there is obviously a chasm of integrity, morality, and statesmanship between each position. Bush can well be faulted for stubbornly insisting on victory even in the face of circumstances that caused many of us -- myself included -- to despair. But compare that to a man stubbornly insisting on defeat even in the face of circumstances suggesting not merely the possibility of victory, but the strong likelihood thereof. And what does he gain? Why, his party has a marginally better chance of taking the White House and picking up a few more Congressional and Senate seats. And he will reap the great personal satisfaction of finally winning a political argument, the argument that the War in Iraq was unwinnable, even if he himself needs to intervene to make sure it is not won. Stay classy, left-liberals. Stay classy. "

[Edited on April 11, 2008 at 3:30 PM. Reason : sdf]

4/11/2008 3:29:24 PM

I see the topic is no longer General Petraeus.

I see he's almost out of the loop anyway...

Quote :

"I am defending the prime ministers ability to defend his government from being shelled in the green zonedisenfranchise political opponents."

[Edited on April 13, 2008 at 2:03 AM. Reason : .]

4/13/2008 2:02:25 AM

Apparently, you just dont get that no government cannot funtion properly if there are militias running around everywhere outside its control.

But no, lets let each bloc have its own militia. If they disagree, they can just fight it out on the streets.

4/13/2008 11:54:44 AM

Desperately throwing out strawman after strawman doesn't change the anti-democratic nature of disenfranchising dissidents. And you're plenty smart enough to know that.

Please. Provide a single instance where I've said or implied that the Mahdi Army shouldn't be policed.

[Edited on April 13, 2008 at 1:23 PM. Reason : ...]

4/13/2008 1:19:16 PM

Sadr just needs to get the picture. The Mahdi army is not needed. We will be getting out regardless of its role. I wonder what he will do.

4/13/2008 4:56:24 PM

At least he ain't gonna support no Al Qaeda, tho. Right?

He's a true Waahabist-hating bastard.

4/13/2008 11:54:56 PM

Yesterday I was reading that 1300 Iraqi security personel made up of police, soldiers, and some high level officers have been fired because they defected, or would not fight in recent weeks. It was at this point that I realized the purpose of the offensive of the past several weeks. This was confirmed today from an author just back from Iraq.

The purpose of the offensive, in part, was to find out who would fight. In two seperate cases it worked very efficiently. Obviously, the current Iraqi forces that defected, or refused to fight were spotted (I beleive they were actually waiting to see who wouldnt fight) and these personel were let go. On the other hand, local militias that did fight with the Iraqi government proved their dispositions and were inducted into the security forces. Here is the article I read today.

Note: This article discusses the main problems that face Iraq in order to become a stable state. My point about the recent operations is a small part of it.

http://www.blackfive.net/main/2008/04/thoughts-on-ira.html

Quote :

"Thoughts on Iraq Posted By Grim Since we're discussing what Yon has said, let me offer some observations of my own. I have just returned from Iraq, where I was a civilian advisor. This is not intended to be in any way the official word of anyone; it's just what I think, having given it rather more than "full time" attention for the last months. Iraq has essentially three problems to "solve" to become a stable country. These are the Sunni problem, the Shia problem, and the Kurdish problem. By "problem" I mean not that the people are a problem, but that each of the main subsets of the population has a particular challenge that has to be resolved before it can integrate into a successful state. (This is, of course, at a high degree of abstraction -- at the ground level, Shiites and Sunnis may be intermarried, etc.) The Sunni problem was rejectionism. The Surge has solved the Sunni problem. That's a fundamental shift in the situation on the ground from a year ago. The gains are -- as Petraeus said -- reversable; that is, it is possible by neglect or malice to create a new Sunni problem. This is chiefly a political responsibility: Congress, State, and the Government of Iraq must ensure they do their part here. (A purely personal opinion: State's operations have improved as much as US military operations have, though they are on a smaller scale as State is on a smaller scale. The PRTs have been a tremendous help, and the current Ambassadors seem to me to be of the first water. The GoI we'll discuss presently. Congress is shameful.) The Shia problem is armed factionalism. The current violence of this last month and going forward represents the start of the solution to that problem. People alarmed by the violence have missed the story. The GoI and the JAM are both disaggregating their bad elements. Mickey Kaus deserves credit for noticing, at least as far as the GoI goes: "Whether it was an incremental success or a humiliating fizzle, hasn't the Maliki government's assault on Sadr-linked Shiite militias operated, de facto, as a highly efficient purge of the Iraqi army? According to Juan Cole, those who heeded calls for defection or who otherwise refused to fight have been fired. ... P.S.: Meanwhile, some 10,000 militia members who did fight on the government's side have reportedly been inducted into the security forces. " What people have not noticed is that JAM is doing essentially the same thing. For quite some time Sadr has been purging JAM of elements that do not obey him. Sadr has said that he will disown members who violate the ceasefire, excepting in self-defense. His proposed truce calls for patience from his members, and comes "after receiving assurances" that his membership will not be targetted if he has them stand down. Those who continue to fight will be ready prey for the Iraqi security forces, many of whom are from the Badr faction. As Wretchard noted, the de facto arbiter of the Shia situation is al Sistani, who has declared that the militias are not legitimate authorities in Iraq. And -- again, crediting Kaus for his careful thinking about what he reads -- the political debates within the Iraqi government seem to favor this overall movement. (It's also worth nothing that the calls for the JAM to surrender its arms have really been only for heavy weapons -- that is, they could retain small arms, as the Sons of Iraq do.) The recent violence has been healthy, then. Disaggregation of irreconcilable elements is a key element to our COIN strategy; here we see it happening naturally. The political process appears to be strengthened, and the Sunni blocks are now participating in helping to settle the Shiite question in a manner acceptable to themselves -- as are the Kurds. That sounds like a genuine national coalition forming, one that will accept Sadr as a political figure. Sadr's own rhetoric, meanwhile, has in this cycle been markedly different from his rhetoric in 2004. It appears that he wants to move into a political role, rather than trying to overthrow and replace the central government. The Shia problem, then, is not resolved -- but it is in the process of being resolved. That is two of the three big problems in Iraq. The last one is the Kurdish problem, which remains latent. The resolution of the disposition of Kirkuk is a potential explosive point. It is possible that this problem will be resolved without serious violence; but it is also possible that it will not be. To this general mixture you should add the tremendous economic progress in Iraq. US military programs -- and PRTs -- are helping to push this economic expansion downward, to tie the whole of the Iraqi population into the gains. This will have an overall beneficial effect on the stability of the nation. The counterinsurgency work we have done has been highly effective. What remains to be done is largely political, though the US military has an important role as a guarantor of stability, and in the training of Iraqi forces for internal defense. The GoI is internally tremendously complex, as The Long War Journal has covered extensively, but it seems to be improving in its capacity. The provincial powers law, finally passed, should allow for the pushing down of powers to the less-internally-complicated provinces, which should improve local governance and services. I have very high personal confidence in the mission in Iraq. If it is supported as it deserves to be, I have no doubt that Iraq will become a fairly nice place. It is already better than a substantial swathe of Africa, whose misery passes almost unnoticed -- though note Paul Salopek's National Geographic piece of this month, and confer with your opinions on Iraq. In return for this last effort, which should require less courage from us than previously, we will gain a permanent ally in the Middle East, and undermine the worst elements of radicalism. We will also protect the lives of millions who have suffered a great deal already: war with Iran, the tyranny of Saddam, and the chaos of this period. They deserve mercy, and that the strong should stand with and defend them. "

*********NOTE: High levels of my opinion*********
In regards to the current operations, I think it should be noted that one of the reasons the US and Iraqi forces have not pushed through and taken control of Sadr city is that they are trying to seperate the forces that are under Sadr's control and the criminals, Iranian forces, and extremists that Sadr and the Government want to eliminate. These forces that have attatched themselves to the Sadr movement have made a bad name for the movement VIA oppressing and intimidating the local population. With the Iraqi forces so close, the groups not under Sadr's direct control will openly attack foot patrols allowing our forces to destroy them, or at least point them out. While Sadr's forces do not attack as I beleive he has ordered. Indeed, Sadr himself might have agreed to this operation in order to clean his own ranks.[/opinion]


[Edited on April 14, 2008 at 9:30 AM. Reason : fsd]

4/14/2008 9:16:10 AM

Quote :

"NAJAF, Iraq - In a new test of stability, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr demanded Monday that the Iraqi government reinstate all security forces fired for deserting during fighting in Basra."

ha

4/14/2008 3:32:18 PM

I just realized that they sent in the green soldiers on purpose.

The idea behind this entire operation was to reduce Sadr's influence in all areas. Both in his militias, and his influence from within the Iraqi Army.

Why you say, because the Mahdi army is literally one of the only things left to overcome. As long as the central government doesnt severely neglect the provinces, there are no more large scale threats.

Send in the green troops, they either stall on their own, or the higher ups stall on purpose, this encourages the Mahdi army who tell the soldiers in the army to defect(thinking they will be able to either defeat or humiliate the central government), and the reason the reinforcements were there so quickly was because that was the plan all along. They had them ready to go.

This was a very well planned operation.

haha, this is great. I am making this all up for the most part. but their is a reason it seemed so rushed, and why Petraeus responded the way he did when questioned about the planning.

Iraq is going to be fine with Iraqi planners like this.

IM CALLING IT!

IRAQ WILL BE FINE!

[Edited on April 14, 2008 at 4:52 PM. Reason : fsd]

4/14/2008 4:51:28 PM

Iraq is very very very much like the US before, during, and after the revolutionary war. State militias, the debate for a central army, regional and cultural differences between northern and southern states. Lets hope the end result is the same.

4/14/2008 5:18:05 PM

Results from operation.

-Greenest battalion gets tons of experience.
-Large amounts of infiltrated Mahdi army exposed on all levels all the way up to general I think
-Proven militias fighting at your side integrated into security forces.
-Hundreds of dead Mahdi army fighters/Iranian special groups/criminals.
-A proven show of force for the entire country.
-Proven planned, coordinated, and executed plan performed as expected.
-Proven able for large troop movements
-Iranian influence shown to the world.
-A perfect training ground for Iraqi army in Sadr city and Basra. The US forces are teaching them to carry out operations in urban environments. I swear they will prolong the engagement to make sure the Iraqis know how to fight.
-Oh yea, and they rescued a CBS reporter kidnapped in feb

I bet we will be able to pull out of Iraq regardless of who is President this January. Well, I really should not go that far but this operation is proof of competence and coordination at high levels.

I think the Saddam era taught Iraqis one thing at least, to be sneaky as shit and to look out for yourself. Man I cant stop beating the Iraqi government off.

Jesus, this is very encouraging.

[Edited on April 14, 2008 at 5:59 PM. Reason : dfg]

4/14/2008 5:58:18 PM

FYI, I can now see in my head how Iraq will play out and how it will become self sufficient.

need some fucking MUSIC IN THIS BITCH!



I am serious about this.

AQI=done
Mahdi army = done

Iran special groups are the only variable.

Quote :

" BEU (7:58:40 PM): http://www.thewolfweb.com/message_topic.aspx?topic=491370&page=4 Arab13 (7:59:44 PM): lol Arab13 (7:59:45 PM): yes Arab13 (8:00:29 PM): b/c nothing relates better to the middle east than old rich white man created black consumer culture BEU (8:00:39 PM): hahaha BEU (8:00:58 PM): Petraeus is straight GANGSTA!"

[Edited on April 14, 2008 at 8:01 PM. Reason : dsa]

4/14/2008 7:56:27 PM

Great news.

So let's get the fuck out.

4/15/2008 2:50:39 AM