On the surface at least, it looks like Gates is gearing up to take on the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex in the upcoming Obama administration. It should be interesting to watch how this goes. On one hand, with the downturn in the economy, DoD is going to be under a lot of pressure to cut costs which will help Gates in cracking skulls on the service heads. Yet at the same time, during a period of economic slowdown, the "Congressional" piece of the iron triangle is going to probably push back HARD, especially in those cases where the particular program falls into the district of an influential congressional leader.

Defense procurement is broken to the point where its crippling our ability to field new equipment, and I'm glad that Gates is going to take the challenge on. It'll be a nasty fight though, and I wish him the best.

Here's an article from Aerospace Weekly & Space Technology, one of the main publications that cover the aerospace industry.

Quote :

"Gates Likely To Force Tradeoffs Among Service Programs Defense secretary turns to procurement clean up Aviation Week & Space Technology 12/08/2008 Author: Amy Butler President-elect Barack Obama announced last week that Robert Gates will become the first Defense secretary ever asked by an incoming president to stay on. Hours later, Gates outlined his plans for the next administration in an exclusive interview with Senior Pentagon Editor Amy Butler on board USAF C-37A. Robert Gates, empowered by a mandate from President-elect Barack Obama to continue serving as Defense secretary, is turning his attention to the thorny issues of acquisition reform and tradeoffs involving the size of the military services’ fleets. These are problems Gates thought he would have to leave unaddressed. “I’d punted them to the next secretary, and I ended up being on the receiving end of the punt,” he says. He made his remarks on a flight to Washington from Minot AFB, N.D., on Dec. 1, the day Obama announced his decision to keep Gates in office. He delivered a speech at Minot, the site of disciplinary firings after mismanagement of the service’s nuclear arsenal came to light. The incidents prompted the dismissal of then-Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley and then-Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne. Gates’s remarks seem to be an attempt to close this dark chapter for an Air Force that he says is “moving in the right direction.” Those dismissals received the attention of senior military leaders. During a press conference, Gates said he does not intend to be a “caretaker” secretary. And, with a reform-minded president-elect backed by Democrats controlling both houses of Congress, military officials are not likely to counter efforts to fix the acquisition system and, possibly, terminate hardware programs. These reforms will affect how the Pentagon will spend its budget—more than $500 billion annually—as the country is dealing with a recession. But, when it comes to money, the U.S. military services aren’t known for collaboration. “While in operational terms, the services have become very joint, I think when it comes to budgets and programs, they are still very service-oriented,” Gates says. “Are you willing—and here is what could get really hard—do you offset risk by investing more in a future-oriented program of one service and less of that in another service?” While Pentagon spending has grown since 2001, its budget to develop and buy new hardware has felt a squeeze owing to the wars abroad and cost of retiree health care. The Air Force had embarked on a strategy to reduce manpower to fund new aircraft. Gates, however, is “totally against cutting manpower in order to fund the platforms.” It is a nationwide clamor for financial belt-tightening that could bring the traditionally bloated and parochial Pentagon to its knees, according to some defense analysts. “It is going to require a level of cooperation from the new service secretaries and the services—as well as [the Office of the Secretary of Defense]—that has not necessarily been the pattern before,” says Gates. The services have customarily been protective of their budgets. Gates, however, says, “I don’t have very much patience with people that are more focused on their budget than on getting the mission done.” Making tradeoffs across the services could produce substantial savings, says one expert. “That is one of the areas that potentially has the biggest long-term savings in terms of total program cost,” says David Berteau, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There is a need not only to look at it from the upfront point of view of buying the system, but the long-term cost of sustaining the system over time.” About 70% of the cost of most platforms is borne out after it is developed, while a service operates and maintains it. Forcing tradeoffs between the services is just one challenge. In recent years, the Pentagon has racked up a series of acquisition misfires ranging from two failed attempts to buy a refueling tanker to replace aging KC-135s to repeated protests and stalls to the Combat Search and Rescue-X (CSAR-X) program. Poor management also led to the termination of the Army’s Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) signals intelligence collection aircraft and its Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. The result: delays coupled with the cost of keeping legacy systems operating. Gates is also planning to clean up a procurement process that has been in turmoil for a decade or more. The two issues go hand in hand, according to Christopher Bolkcom, a defense specialist at the Congressional Research Service. “If he is successful at leading such rationalization [across the services], it would be a breakthrough to one of the biggest obstacles we have had to defense acquisition reform.” Gates says he plans to make changes within the existing acquisition structure at the Pentagon and with forthcoming political appointees, rather than establishing a task force­—as he did to boost intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the war. He wants to “maximize the number of platforms,” rather than developing fewer, highly capable systems—a long-sought balance that has yet to be achieved. “One of the things I think we have to be concerned about is investing billions of dollars in systems that ultimately we won’t have the money to field in any numbers or where we have to kill a system after we spent a lot of money on it,” says Gates. Worries about cramming too much technology onto a single platform waylaid plans to proceed with the Air Force’s Transformational Satellite program (see p. 47). And the Air Force’s stealthy, twin-engine Lockheed Martin F-22 fighter production line could close because it’s too costly to field in high numbers. One tradeoff is whether to buy more legacy fighters or stealthy F-35s, also built by Lockheed Martin. “Gates is aware of the F-22/F-35 debate and he’s also aware that the Raptor is almost technologically obsolete,” says a former Clinton administration Pentagon appointee. “It’s showing its age because the development program took so long. The F-22’s processors are far less capable than those in the F-35.” With a funding shortage, the Air Force may have to back off of ambitious technology and purchases. And the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are likely to be forced into developing a more collaborative strategy for tactical aircraft. This could mean tradeoffs among Boeing Super Hornets and Lockheed Martin’s family of fighters. Industry sources note the Air National Guard has expressed interest in the F-16, despite a longtime policy to purchase only stealthy fighters. “Additional F-16s and Super Hornets? The Navy has gone that route—the question is, until you get the Joint Strike Fighter, do you go that route or do you try and build more F-22s,” Gates notes. This points to a need for collaboration among the services in forming requirements up front. Often, joint programs collapse or wind up with a single sponsor after interservice spats. This question of how much technology must be incorporated into new systems—the Navy’s Zumwalt class of destroyers and the Army’s digitized Future Combat System and the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser—is likely to cause heartburn in the services. It will also be a tough sell on Capitol Hill, where lawmakers often advocate for work in their districts. “Congress will have a lot of trouble with this,” says one former acquisition official at the Pentagon. “The best hope [the Defense Dept.] will have is a comprehensive, integrated package . . . rather than picking off one program at a time.” However, with the financial crisis, Gates may be able to strike an accord with legislators. The service chiefs of staff today are also not in a position to block program terminations, and they have been chosen specifically to be more collaborative, a former Pentagon official says. “But, none of them are in a position to execute it without a strong service secretary and a strong undersecretary for acquisition.” Gates, and his yet-to-be named cast of political appointees, will have to craft a new force structure mix in the areas of tactical aircraft, airlift and shipbuilding. Gates says the Pentagon must balance its force mix to address future “near-peer” fights as well as to handle today’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This could also force unprecedented collaboration among air, sea and land in the area of weapons and directed-energy systems..."

12/8/2008 12:14:42 PM

Article continued...

Quote :

"Gates’s focus on the deployment of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles for ground forces and low-tech intelligence systems addressed gaps in capabilities for the war effort, he says. He bristles at the notion that the more rudimentary systems, such as C-12s fielded to collect imagery and video in Iraq, cannot be useful in other war settings. “These are pretty low-cost solutions. The reality is, we are going to need these. We have basically stripped most of the rest of the world of these ISR capabilities—our other combatant commands,” Gates says. “There will be a demand for these capabilities all over the world for as far into the future as anyone can see—whether it is counter-narcotics, whether it is counterterrorism, whether it is border security or new challenges,” he adds, noting that more intelligence collection could be helpful in Africa and will also be offered to support Iraq as U.S. troops begin to withdraw under Obama. Missile defense is one area that Gates seemed uncertain about under the Obama administration. Advocates for the system are worried that Obama may cut programs, and last week Airborne Laser program officials began to lay out a case for why the 747-based chemical laser, designed to disable ballistic missiles in boost phase, could be applied to other missions, including air superiority and air defense."

12/8/2008 12:15:08 PM

Im interested to see how this turns out, the current system seems pretty entrenched.

Im definitely a supporter of anything that makes our service people more effective and safer, which I think prioritizing the way they spend money could go a long way in doing

12/8/2008 1:51:36 PM

So much money is wasted thrown away it's incredible. Honestly, the DoD can do a lot to improve wasteful spending, but most of the crap comes from congress and it's regardless of political party. You have some incredibly stupid/wasteful programs, but at the same type you have programs that seem silly (such as the Future Force Warrior), but will probably pay dividends in the future. You can't just cut a programs because it isn't dong much now, or you are going to cut our edge against other countries. It's a hard nut to crack, because it's so convoluted and it's hard to tell what's worthwhile and what's pure shit.

12/8/2008 7:43:35 PM

You know, the sad thing is that a lot of these costs are being driven by insane, bleeding-edge technological requirements. Its a shame on both sides: the military for asking for platinum-plated weapon systems and the contractors for going along with it.

I suppose its not too big a surprise though. We're in a "buyer's market" right now for the arms trade where a company losing a single competitive bid could literally spell out the death, or at very least the loss of thousands of jobs, for a major arms contractor. Thus, contractors are going to be overly ambitious bidding these contracts.

12/9/2008 11:20:07 AM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKFAqoGRBs8&feature=related

12/11/2008 2:53:00 PM

First, Gates statements don't sound like they go nearly far enough. If what ends up happening is that projects have to go through 3 or 4 separate bureaucracies to get approved, then this will be a failure.

If you could find a magical way to get rid of all the incompetents and crap projects in DoD, I am absolutely certain that you could cut the budget by 50% AND get better results. That's how screwed up DoD procurement is. DoD is worse than other branches because cutting defense has the stigma of looking unpatriotic and DoD can hide a lot of failures behind classification.

As stated above, though, they need to couple new procurement with something to GET RID OF INCOMPETENT EMPLOYEES. This is a fundamental government problem. (And im not talking about simply substituting contractors without a big change in incentive structures )

I am not sure that new procurement procedure above will do fuck all if your work force and management is polluted by people who have no incentive to do a good job or improve themselves. (Granted, it may prevent leech contractors from bilking the government as much as they do). The talent level of your employees and the ability of those employees to apply their talents determine organization success. For DoD, large chunks of their organizations are dysfunctional.

After you fix those two things [understatement], you can move on to giving your employees the leeway to be innovative.

So in summary, you basically need several big revolutions to fix DoD waste. Or you need a big war -- a lot of fat gets cut out when you quickly need to figure out a better way to kill something.

[Edited on December 11, 2008 at 7:41 PM. Reason : .]

12/11/2008 7:37:54 PM

For those interested in acquisition reform:

http://www.defensedaily.com/publications/dd/New-Acquisition-Panel-To-Look-At-Hill-Meddling-Chairman-Says_5973.html

My personal instinct says its asking the foxes to investigate the failures of hen house security.

Quote :

"New Acquisition Panel To Look At Hill Meddling, Chairman Says By Emelie Rutherford The head of a new House panel tackling Pentagon acquisition reform pledged yesterday to examine to what extent lawmakers hinder weapons systems' development. Rep. Robert Andrews (D-N.J.) told reporters the new Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform he chairs will examine "institutional or cultural pressures or problems" contributing to the shortfall between money spent on and quality of items purchased by the Pentagon. Hindrances to be examined, he said, include "the Congress itself, and the practices or politics of the Congress in ways that it may be an impediment to reform." Leaders of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) announced last Friday the formation of the new panel intended to address broad issues surrounding the defense acquisition process. The seven-member panel will exist for at least six months and is intended to compile a report that will guide the fiscal year 2011 defense authorization act, which lawmakers are expected to consider early next year, the HASC said. Rep. Mike Conaway (R-Texas) is the new panel's ranking member, and its members are Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.), Brad Ellsworth (D-Ind.), Joe Sestak (D-Pa.), Duncan Hunter (R- Calif.), and Mike Coffman (R-Colo.). The panel's formation comes at a time several related defense-spending efforts are underway, including the Senate Armed Services Committee's (SASC) leaders' push for Pentagon procurement reform legislation and a government contract review initiated by President Obama. Analyst Loren Thompson said there is "a sense of fatalism about acquisition reform in the defense industry." "On the one hand, (defense industry officials) know the Democrats are determined to crack down on contractors; On the other hand, they also know that most of the problems are ultimately traceable to the political system, rather than to the performance of the companies," said Thompson, the chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute. Because lawmakers' input in programs at times is driven more by jobs in their districts than by military requirements and weapons-system success, he said, "members in industry figure that either things are going to get worse, or they're just going stay the same, but they're not likely to get better." If the defense-acquisition process worsens, Thompson said, there could be more reporting requirements, oversight, and constrains, but no real improvements in the rigor of systems being developed and built. Andrews is optimistic the panel he chairs can sway detrimental congressional input in Pentagon efforts, he said yesterday in a conference call. "I think it would be irresponsible to say that...Congress is not in part responsible for this problem," Andrews said. "I think we probably are. And to fix it is going to take some discipline, and I'm all for that." The New Jersey lawmaker said the panel also will seek to measure and find the causes of defense procurement shortfalls, and then examine and recommend remedies. "This panel is all about diagnosis, evaluation of remedies, and affixing a cure," he said. He acknowledged there have been dozens of similar reform efforts over the years, but said the climate in Washington is different now. "You really have the major decision makers in the White House and in the congressional branch interested in stepping on some toes here and doing what's necessary to fix this problem," he said. He cited defense program cost overruns as well as delays, changes, and insufficient competition for programs. Andrews said the panel hopes to "build on" and "broaden" the reform bill touted by SASC Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and Ranking Member John McCain (R-Ariz.). Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) is filing a version of the legislation in the House. Andrews said he has not yet talked to any defense contractors about the new panel, but said their views are welcome. The congressman emphasized panel members will not focus on particular weapons systems. He declined to speculate on whether the panel's final report will recommend specific programmatic changes. He said the panel will meet privately this week, and will hold "a lot" of public hearings with witnesses "who have very highly developed points of view on this question." Levin introduced two weeks ago wide-reaching legislation to reform the way DoD buys weapons, and bill co-sponsor McCain met last week with Pentagon officials about it (Defense Daily, Feb. 24). Defense Secretary Robert Gates has pledged to make defense acquisition reform a priority during his time in the Obama administration, and Obama cited last week Pentagon program overruns when he signed a memo calling for reviewing and possibly canceling existing government contracts (Defense Daily, Dec. 3, 2008; March 5). Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) also is chairing a new Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Contracting Oversight ad hoc subcommittee and planning to scrutinize defense contracts. HASC Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) and Ranking Member John McHugh (R-N.Y.) acknowledged the repeated tries over the years to improve the acquisition process. "Significant reforms are once again needed, in part because the acquisition system must change as DoD's needs change," Skelton said in a statement. "Before we simply enact more regulations, we must understand the root causes of the Department of Defense's acquisition challenges in order to generate suggestions to affect real reform," McHugh said in the statement."

3/10/2009 11:16:50 AM